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Abstract 
The unprecedented growth of cellular traffic driven by web surfing, video streaming, 
and cloud-based services is creating challenges for cellular service providers to fulfill 
the unmet demand. To minimize congestion costs for under-served demand (e.g., 
dissatisfied customers, or churn), the service provider is willing to pay WiFi hotspots to 
serve the demand that exceeds capacity. This paper proposes an optimal procurement 
mechanism with contingent contracts for service providers to leverage the advantages 
of both cellular and WiFi resources. Compared to conventional cellular communication 
technologies, WiFi hotspots provide data rates with a more limited coverage. Our 
present work contributes to the existing literature by developing an analytical model, 
which considers this unique challenge of integrating the longer range cellular resource 
and shorter range WiFi hotspots. The simulation results show that the proposed 
procurement mechanism significantly outperforms the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG) auction in terms of the service provider's expected payoff. 
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Introduction 
We are witnessing an explosion of mobile data traffic driven by web surfing, video streaming, and online 
gaming. Global mobile data traffic grew 70 percent in 2012 and will increase thirteen-fold between 2012 
and 2017 (Cisco 2013). The increasing popularity of smartphones has caused the surge in data usage. In 
2012, the typical smartphone generated 50 times more mobile data traffic than the typical non-
smartphone (Cisco 2013). Cloud applications and services such as Netflix, YouTube, Pandora, and Spotify, 
contribute to the unprecedented growth of cellular traffic. Business demand is also one of the chief drivers 
behind this increase in data traffic as the workforce goes mobile, and data moves to the cloud.1 
The huge amount of data traffic poses a challenge to the network infrastructure: Cellular networks are 
overloaded and congested during peak hours because of the insufficient capacity. Network congestion can 
lead to a bad user experience and churn. The cellular networks, such as AT&T and Verizon, need to solve 
the challenge of effectively fulfilling the unmet demand from consumers for high network quality. 
The previous literature proposed several solutions from both technical and economic aspects: (1) 
increasing the number of cellular base stations or deploying the cell-splitting technology; 2 (2) upgrading 
the network to fourth-generation (4G) networks such as Long Term Evaluation (LTE), High Speed Packet 
Access (HSPA), and WiMax; (3) expanding capacity by acquiring of the spectrum of other networks, such 
as the attempted purchase of T-Mobile USA by AT&T; (4) adopting tiered pricing mechanisms (e.g. usage 
based price plans) to constrain the heaviest mobile data users, instead of using flat-rate pricing plans with 
unlimited data3; and (5) offloading data traffic to WiFi networks (Bulut and Szymanski 2012). 
Although all these solutions help solve the problem, each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The first and second solutions are effective in the long term. However, they require heavy investments, 
and getting government approval for building a new cell tower can take two years. It is extremely 
expensive to increase the number of cellular base stations just for peak traffic demands. The health effect 
from cell tower radiation also raises a public concern.4 As a result, all cellular networks augment the first 
and second solutions with other approaches to expanding capacity. The third solution suffers from 
regulatory constraints. Cramton, Skrzypacz, and Wilson (2007) show that an important market failure 
arises in spectrum auctions with dominant incumbents. They suggest that the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) should place limits on how much spectrum AT&T and Verizon are allowed to buy. This 
concern is also reflected in the action taken by the FCC to block the recent merger between AT&T and T-
Mobile. 
Because of these technical, economic and regulatory constraints, the fifth solution, using WiFi hotspots 
for mobile data traffic offloading, seems to be the most promising approach in augmenting the first two 
solutions. WiFi hotspots refer to third-party hotspot owners, such as local restaurants, bookstores, and 
hotels, which offer WiFi service to their customers. WiFi offloading could potentially be a win-win 
solution: The cellular service provider achieves significant savings by not building more cellular base 
stations just for the peak traffic demands. The WiFi Hotspots gain additional revenue from their 
otherwise wasted spare capacity. WiFi offloading is particularly useful in supporting the mobile data 
demands during peak hours. Paul et al. (2011) find that 28% of subscribers generate traffic only in a single 
hour during peak hours in a day. However, offloading data traffic to third-party WiFi hotspots is not 
purely a technology augmenting the existing cellular network. It is also a mechanism design problem, 
considering the economic incentives of third-party WiFi hotspots. Instead of focusing only on technical 
aspects, we need to combine both the technology of computing and auction theory to solve the challenge 
of effectively using WiFi hotspots. The tight integration of economics and computation technology in our 
system is seen as crucial to address issues surrounding the data traffic support for cloud-based services on 
                                                             
1 Information workers have enabled devices to allow anywhere access to databases on the road. When they return to the office, they 
recharge their smartphones or tablets on docking stations that interface seamlessly with the company’s cloud storage facility. 
2 See Balachandran et al. (2008).  
3 Gupta et al. (2011) shows that the average net benefits realized under congestion-based pricing tend to be higher than the average 
net benefits realized under flat-rate pricing. 
4 See http://www.mountshastaecology.org/Archive/Health_Effects_from_Cell_Phone_Tower_Radiation.html/. 
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mobile networks, such as business collaboration tools, which require sufficient download and upload 
speeds. 
As more businesses employ mobile collaboration tools to increase productivity, mobile bandwidth 
availability becomes a key issue in marketing and operations for service providers. The objective of this 
study is to cope with the problem of peak data traffic by leveraging the advantages of both cellular and 
WiFi resources for service providers.  
There are several challenges in the design of this procurement auction system. First, a unique challenge in 
our problem setting is that the longer-range cellular resource introduces coupling between the shorter-
rang WiFi hotspots. WiFi networks usually have a more limited range than cellular resources. We need to 
design an innovative procurement auction considering this different spatial coverage. Second, the data 
traffic is uncertain and changes quickly over time. It is critical to provide real-time support for computing 
the optimal contract. Third, Dong et al. (2012) propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) type auction for 
mobile data offloading. A VCG auction is socially efficient, but it is not optimal for the cellular network 
(the buyer). A typical VCG mechanism leads to an overpayment to suppliers (Chen et al. 2005). The 
simulation results in our study show that, compared to the standard VCG auction, a procurement auction 
with contingent contracts can significantly improve the cellular network’s expected payoff. 
In this paper, we propose a procurement mechanism with contingent contracts to meet these challenges. 
The auction rule is contingent on demand uncertainty (i.e. consumers’ mobile data traffic). In the model, 
we partition the range of a cellular base station (a cell sector) into several regions. The cellular resource 
can serve data traffic in any region, whereas the WiFi resource can only serve local traffic. In the optimal 
design of such a procurement system, the economic model and the computing technology are 
complements. After characterizing the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction, we need to compute the 
contract under each demand contingency and store the contracts. When the demand is realized, we can 
find the corresponding contingent contract. In our real-time auctions, computing and finding the 
corresponding contingent contract fast is critical. Recent advances in parallel computing, such as the open 
source cluster computing system, Spark5, makes it faster to find contingent contracts in large databases. 
With extremely fast computing speeds, our auction system can compute and implement a huge number of 
contingent contracts — a task was once considered computationally prohibitive, and significantly improve 
the cellular network’s expected gain. 
Literature Review 
Two streams of literature are related to this study. The first stream involves the study of three different 
auction schemes: quantity auctions, scoring auctions, and auctions with contingent contracts. Dasgupta 
and Spulber (1989) extend the standard fixed quantity auction and study an auction that allows the 
quantity of the goods purchased to be endogenously based on the submitted bids. They consider a model 
with one buyer and a number of potential suppliers and ask the following question: How much of a 
product should be purchased and from which supplier? Our study differs from their approach in two 
critical ways: First, the unique feature of different spatial coverage makes a difference for the optimal 
auction design. Buying more resources from a local WiFi hotspot in one region frees up more cellular 
resources. Second, the auction rules are determined by the contingency terms. The terms of a contingent 
contract are not finalized until the uncertain demand is realized. 
In many procurement situations, the buyer cares about other attributes in addition to price when 
evaluating the submitted bids. In a scoring auction, suppliers submit multidimensional bids, and the 
contract is awarded to the supplier who submitted the bid with the highest score according to the scoring 
rule. Che (1993) develops a scoring procurement auction in which suppliers bid on two dimensions of the 
good. However, a scoring auction typically allows only sole sourcing, but in our procurement setting, 
offloading data traffic to multiple WiFi hotspots is naturally done. Liu, Chen, and Whinston (2010) study 
the scoring rule under keyword auctions. 
Contingent contracts have been widely studied in economics literature (Wilson 1989).6 Chen, Xu, and 
                                                             
5 Spark is an open source cluster computing system that aims to make data analytics fast. It provides primitives for in-memory 
cluster computing: Data can be loaded into memory and be queried repeatedly much more quickly than with disk-based systems. 
6 A contingent contract is a type of forward contract that depends on the realizations of some uncertain events. For example, a 
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Whinston (2009) show that the procurement auctions with contingent contracts can manage the project 
failure risk of suppliers and significantly improve both social welfare and the buyer’s payoff. The model in 
our study differs from such auctions in the application setting and auction formats. 
Our research is also related to the computer science literature on mobile data offloading. 
Balasubramanian, Mahajan, and Venkataramani (2010) design a WiFi offloading system to augment 
mobile 3G capacity. They find that for a realistic workload, WiFi offloading can reduce 3G usage by almost 
half for a delay tolerance of one minute.7 Dong et al. (2012) propose a VCG procurement auction for 
mobile offloading to incentivize WiFi hotspot owners to be truthful in the bidding process. The integration 
of economics and computation technology allows us to improve the cellular network’s expected payoff in 
two important ways: (1) The appropriate mechanism design avoids overpayment in the VCG auction 
(economics); and (2) the parallel computing technology improves the performance of the procurement 
auction by computing and finding the optimal contract under each contingency on demand uncertainty 
(computation technology). 
A Benchmark Model: Single WiFi Region 
A cellular network provides service to its customers who demand for bandwidth to connect to the Internet. 
Congestion results when network capacity cannot satisfy instantaneous user demand. When the user 
demand for mobile data is below a certain threshold , the cellular network face no additional cost 
except the sunk cost of buying the spectrum and keeping the system running. However, when the demand 
  exceeds the threshold, the cellular network incurs a cost of   .   is the cellular capacity8 
owned by the cellular network. The standard metrics used in the telecommunications industry to measure 
quality of service (QoS), such as Kleinrock delay formula, depend on the difference between user demand 
and capacity (Pinto and Sibley 2013). In our problem setting,     is the difference between user 
demand and cellular capacity. The cost function ⋅ is strictly increasing and strictly convex, which 
captures the rapidly rising cost of congestion. A similar convex cost function has been widely used in 
modeling the congestion cost in the Internet (Fortz, Rexford, and Thorup 2002). Apparently, we have 
C  0 for any   0. Denote    as the marginal cost of congestion.  
We model the demand for bandwidth as a random variable  with a cumulative distribution function  
in the support 0,19. Given the unprecedented growth rate of mobile data demand and the high cost 
associated with congestion, the cellular network is interested in procuring spare resources from third-
party WiFi hotspots. 
In this benchmark model, we assume: (1) A single winning hotspot obtains the procurement contract. (2) 
The range of a cellular base station (a cell sector) is the same as the range of a hotspot (a WiFi region), for 
simplicity. Thus, we only have a single WiFi region in a cell sector. We relax these two assumptions in 
Section 4. 
The timeline for this benchmark model is shown in Figure 1. If the cellular network purchases  units of 
bandwidth from the hotspots, then the expected reduction of congestion cost for the cellular network is  
    	      	     , (1) 
which is the valuation that the cellular network attaches to the additional bandwidth . The first part 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
contract can be contingent on the uncertain demand or the future spot market price. 
7 Lee et al. (2010) show that a WiFi network offloads about 65% of the total mobile data traffic and saves 55% of battery power 
without using any delayed transmission. 
8 ! is interpreted as the channel capacity stated by the Shannon–Hartley theorem (Kennington, Olinick, and Rajan 2011). The 
theorem shows that when the information transmitted rate is less than !, the probability of error at the receiver can be made 
arbitrary small. When the information transmitted rate is greater than !, the probability of error increases as the information 
transmitted rate is increased. 
9 Note that the assumption of the support is essentially saying that demand is bounded, which is without loss of generality for any 
realistic situation. Of course, the interpretation of 1 will be different for different scenarios. For example, 1 could be interpreted as 1 
terabyte per second or 10 terabytes per second. 
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 	     is the expected congestion cost without procuring from WiFi hotspots, and the 
second part,  	     G is the expected congestion cost when the purchase quantity is . 
Because  
    	      # 0 (2) 
and  
    	       0$ %  & 0, 
where $⋅ is the density function of  .  is strictly increasing and strictly concave, which is not 
surprising given that the cost of congestion is convex. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Timeline for a Single Region Auction 
 
We assume that the cost function for hotspot ' to provide capacity ( to the cellular network is  
 (, )* ≡  	, -, )*-, '  1,2, . . . , 0. 
where -, )* 1 0 is the marginal cost function for hotspot ' , and where )*  represents each hotspot’s 
private information about the cost of capacity provision. The cost of providing bandwidth for a hotspot is 
based on its instantaneous user demand and many other considerations that may not be revealed to the 
cellular network. We assume 2-, )* 1 0 to capture the fact that the marginal cost of providing capacity 
for each hotspot increases as more capacity is provided to the cellular network. Marginal costs are 
increasing and convex in the cost parameter, 3 1 0, 33 1 0. Also, we assume 23 1 0. Hotspots’ cost 
parameters are independently and identically distributed with a continuously differentiable cumulative 
distribution function 4⋅ defined on ), )̅ which is common knowledge. Define 6) ≡ 4)/4), and 
let 6)  be an increasing function of ) . This assumption of monotone hazard rate is satisfied by 
commonly used distribution functions such as the uniform distribution. 
It follows from Dasgupta and Spulber (1989) that the optimal allocation can be implemented via a 
quantity auction (sealed bid) where 
• The cellular network announces a payment-bandwidth schedule !  !(; 
• Each hotspot chooses the bandwidth they want to sell given, !(; and 
• The hotspot choosing to provide the highest capacity wins the auction and sells the chosen capacity to 
the cellular provider.  
This quantity auction is optimal for the cellular network if we assume that a single winner emerges. Given 
the payment-bandwidth schedule !(, the hotspots’ biding strategy is denoted by (): A hotspot with 
private cost parameter, ) ∈ ), )̅, bids (). Let )∗ be a threshold cost parameter: Hotspots for which the 
cost parameter exceeds )∗ do not bid, while those with ) & )∗ bid according to (). This represents the 
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individual rationality constraint. 
Proposition 1 (Single Region) In the optimal quantity auction, the payment-bandwidth schedule 
!∗( and the optimal bidding strategy (∗) are given by the following equations:  
 !∗:(∗);  (∗), ) %  	
<∗
< :=>?;
@A B<,∗?,3C?
:=>3;@A , (3) 
 (∗)  ,(∗), ) % ,3(∗), )6). (4) 
The cellular network’s expected profit is  
 0  	3∗3 :1  4);D=4)(  (, )  3(, )6)). (5) 
Under asymmetric information, this is the highest expected profit for the cellular network when it must 
procure from a single winning hotspot.  
Sketchy Proof. the hotspot with the lowest ) always wins the auction, so the sum of the expected profits 
of the cellular network and the hotspots is  
 0  	3∗3 :1  4);D=4)(  (, )), 
Thus, the cellular network’s expected profit is given by  
 0  	3∗3 :1  4);D=4)(  (, )  3(, )6)). 
Let (∗) be determined by the following first-order condition:  
 (∗)  ,(∗), ) % ,3(∗), )6). 
(∗) clearly maximizes the cellular network’s expected profit. We can further show that (∗) is an 
equilibrium bidding strategy for the hotspots. ■ 
Note that the hotspot with the lowest ) always wins the auction. In equation 5, 0:1  4);D=4) is the 
density of the lowest ). The cellular network’s benefit is the expected reduction of the congestion cost, 
which is given by equation 1. (, ) % 3(, )6) is the "virtual cost" the cellular network pays to the 
winning hotspot. Under complete information, the payment to the winning hotspot is the cost (, ). 
The information asymmetry is reflected in the term 3(, )6), which is the information rent of the 
winning hotspot. 
Multiple WiFi Regions 
A Non-Contingent Procurement Auction 
In the benchmark model, we assume that only a single hotspot wins the auction. However, the WiFi 
capacity for one hotspot is limited, and relying on multiple hotspots is optimal because of the convexity of 
the congestion cost functions. The benchmark model also assumes that the range of a cellular base station 
is the same as the range of a hotspot. However, cellular resources and WiFi resources actually have 
different spatial coverages. In suburban areas, a typical cellular base station covers 1-2 miles (2-3 km) and 
in dense urban areas, it may cover 1/4 - 1/2 mile (400-800 m). A typical WiFi network has a range of 120 
feet (32 m) indoors and 300 feet (95 m) outdoors.10 Therefore, we need to partition a cell sector into 
several regions. In Figure 2, a red circle is a WiFi region. Usually, a WiFi region has several WiFi hotspots 
that are close together.  
Now suppose there are E WiFi regions in a cell sector, 1,2,⋯ ,E, and the demand for region G is H. The 
demand vector , I, ⋯ , J has a joint distribution function , I, ⋯ , J. We assume the same 
congestion cost function of the cellular network for all regions. Cellular resources can serve traffic in any 
                                                             
10 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wifi, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cell_site. 
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region G, whereas WiFi hotspots in region G can only serve local traffic.11 A unique challenge in the 
procurement auction is that the longer range cellular resource introduces coupling between the shorter 
range WiFi hotspots. In this section, we derive the optimal auction rule under different spatial coverages. 
 
 
Figure  2. Mutiple WiFi Regions 
 
The timeline for a multiple region auction is shown in Figure 3. The cellular network follows a two-stage 
decision procedure. In the first stage, it purchases WiFi capacity from hotspots in different regions. In the 
second stage, the cellular network adjusts the allocation of cellular resources across regions.  
We first focus on the optimization problem in the second stage. If the cellular network purchases H units 
of bandwidth from hotspots in region G, then the expected congestion cost is  
 MinN ,NO,⋯,NP  	  	 ⋯ 	 ∑ 	JHR H  H  SH, I, ⋯ , J 
 T. U.		 ∑ 	JHR SH   , SH 1 0, forG  1,2, . . . E, (6) 
where SH is the amount of cellular capacity allocated to region G. The cellular network can adjust the 
allocation of cellular resources across regions through varing yZ. Purchasing more capacity from a local 
WiFi hotspot frees up more cellular resources, which can be allocated to other regions. We assume that 
cellular capacity can be reallocated seamlessly from one geographic area to another. This assumption is 
true for the capacity that can be redirected (e.g., core processing for the base station or backhaul from the 
base station site). For some capacity that cannot be redirected (e.g., radio capacity for directional 
antennas – these cover only a certain direction and angular range), this is not true, but we believe it is a 
reasonable assumption when we focus on the core capacity.  
Similarly, without hotspots, the expected congestion cost is  
 MinN ,NO,⋯,NP  	  	 ⋯ 	 ∑ 	JHR H  SH, I, ⋯ , J 
 T. U.		 ∑ 	JHR SH   , SH 1 0, forG  1,2, . . . E. (7) 
Because ⋅ is convex, using Jensen’s inequality, we have  
                                                             
11 A WiFi hotspot might be on the boundary of two regions. In practice, we can generate regions by clustering the WiFi hotspots 
using k-means method. 
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 ∑ 	JHR H  SH 1 E ⋅  [J∑ 	JHR H  SH\  E ⋅ ] (8) 
 ∑ 	JHR H  H  SH 1 E ⋅  [J∑ 	JHR H  H  SH\  E ⋅ ]  ], 
where  
 ]   O⋯P=J , and] 
 O⋯P
J . 
If we define    % I %⋯% J    as the total excess demand of the sector, ]  /E  can be 
interpreted as the average excess demand across regions. The optimal allocation of cellular resources 
should be SH∗  H  ]  H  ] with using WiFi hotspots and SH∗  H  ] without using hotspots. 
 
 
Figure  3. Timeline for a Multiple Region Auction 
 
For such allocations of cellular resources across regions to be feasible, we need SH∗ 1 0, or equivalently, 
 

J 1 [H 

J∑ 	J*R *\  [H 

J∑ 	J*R *\, (9) 
for G  1,2, . . . , E. The condition is more likely to be satisfied if bandwidth demand and hotspots supply 
are relatively homogeneous across regions or if  is relatively large.12 We assume ineqaulity 9 is always 
satisfied. 
The expected reduction of congestion cost for the cellular network after the procurement of hotspot 
bandwidth is  
 , I, ⋯ , J 
  E 	  	 ⋯ 	 ], I, ⋯ , J  E  	  	 ⋯ 	 ]  ], I,⋯ , J. 
Because the valuation function is only a function of , ⋯ , J through ], we denote the distribution of ] 
as ̅ and rewrite the valuation as  
 , I, ⋯ , J  ]  E  	 ]̅]  E  	] ]  ]̅] (10) 
Note the similarity between the valuation function for the case of a single region (equation 1) and the 
valuation function for the case of multiple regions (equation 10), which immediately implies that ] is 
also increasing and concave in ]. Indeed, the single region case can be viewed as the same as a multiple-
region case in which E  1. 
Because the valuation function is only a function of , ⋯ , J  through ], the task of undertaking multiple 
                                                             
12 Cisco (2013) estimates that 20% - 30% amount of smartphone traffic was offloaded through WiFi in the U.S. In this case, ! is four 
times larger than ∑ 	J*R *  . A direction for future research is to relax this assumption.  
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procurements in multiple regions is essentially the same task as undertaking a single procurement in one 
sector in which the bandwidth capacity is procured from several hotspots in different regions. In other 
words, we are dealing with a variable quantity procurement auction with multiple winners. In the first 
stage, the cellular network’s optimization problem is characterized as a direct revelation game in which 
hotspots announce their types and truthful revelation is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We adopt the 
notational convention of writing )=*  ), . . . , )*=, )*, . . . , )D. The optimal allocation for the cellular 
network can be implemented via a direct revelation mechanism where  
• The cellular network announces a payment-bandwidth schedule *`)* , )=*, and a bandwidth allocation 
schedule -*  ()* , )=*; 
• Hotspot ' reports the private cost parameter )* given *`)* , )=* and ()* , )=*; 
• Hotspot '  provides WiFi Capacity -*  ()* , )=*  to the cellular network and its payment is *` 
*`)* , )=*.  
The optimal mechanism : *`∗)* , )=*, (∗)* , )=*;  for the cellular network is given by the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2 (Multiple Regions) In the optimal direct revelation mechanism, all hotspots truthfully 
announce their cost parameters ) . The optimal bandwidth allocation schedule -*  (∗)* , )=* , for '  1,2, . . . 0 is given by: 
 a ∑ 	D*R -*  -* , )* % 3-* , )*6)*. 
where ]  a∑ 	D*R -*  E 	 ]̅]  E  	 P∑ 	@bc 2b ] 

J∑ 	D*R -*̅]. The optimal payment 
schedule *`  *`∗)* , )=*, for '  1,2, . . . 0 is given by: 
 *`∗)* , )=*  (∗)* , )=*, )* %  	3
∗
3b 3(∗)* , )=*, )). 
The cellular network’s expected profit is 
 dea:∑ 	D*R (∗)*, )=*;  ∑ 	D*R (∗)*, )=*, )*  ∑ 	D*R 3(∗)* , )=*, )*6)*f. 
Under asymmetric information, this is the highest expected profit for the cellular network when it can 
procure capacity from multiple hotspots in different regions (second best).  
Sketchy Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. For a multiple region auction, the 
cellular network’s expected profit is 
 dea∑ 	D*R -*  ∑ 	D*R -* , )*  ∑ 	D*R 3-* , )*6)*f. 
Because the hotspots’ congestion cost functions are convex, the virtual marginal costs are equalized across 
hotspots:  
 a ∑ 	D*R -*  -* , )* % 3-* , )*6)*.  
for '  1,2, . . . 0. The bandwidth allocation schedule -*  ()* , )=* satisfying this equation maximizes the 
cellular network’s expected profit. ■ 
In the direct revelation game, hotspot ' announces its cost parameter )*. The capacity it needs to provide 
is -*  (∗)* , )=* , and its payment is *`  *`∗)* , )=* . This optimal mechanism is a global auction 
including all hotspots from different regions. Note that launching separate auctions within each region is 
not optimal. The intuition is that procuring more WiFi resources in one region frees up more cellular 
resources, and the cellular network can allocate the cellular resources to other regions. In equilibrium, the 
virtual marginal costs are equalized across hotspots in different regions. 
The following steps describe the procedure of computing the optimal procurement auction. We present 
the simulation results in Section 5.  
 • Invite each of the 0 hotspots to report its cost parameter ). Denote the submitted cost parameters as 
g), )I, ⋯ , )Dh. 
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• Define the map -: ΘD → lD as follows: 
        - For each '  1,2,⋯ , 0 and  1 0, let m* be the implicit function satisfying the following 
equation  
 m*, )* % 3m*, )*6)*  . 
Because the left-hand-side of the equation is increasing in m*, given a value of , m* can be easily 
solved using bisection in the interval 0, -]* where -]* is a positive number large enough so that the value of 
left-hand-side exceeds . 
        - From equation 10, a - can be written as  
 a -   	] ]  ]̅]   	2/J ]  -/E̅]. 
Let -∗ be the solution to the following equation:  
 ∑ 	D*R m*:a -;  -. 
Again, because the left-hand-side is decreasing in -, we can easily solve for -∗ using bisection in the 
interval 0,E.13 
        - Let  
 - ≡ -, -I, ⋯ , -H ≡ :ma -∗, mIa -∗,⋯ , mHa -∗;. 
• Define payment plan *`  as  
 *` ≡ *`), ⋯ , )H ≡ -* , )* %  	3∗3b 3-*), )=*, )), (11) 
where )∗ is a threshold cost parameter to be determined. 
• Hotspot ' will provide capacity -* and receive payment *`. The capacity allocation and payment schedule -* , *` consist of the optimal feasible mechanism with the choice of )∗.14 The expected profit of each 
hotspot before the auction is:  
 Π*)*   	3∗3b d=*3-*), )=*, )). 
• The expected gain of the cellular network before the auction is  
 o)∗  dea-∗  ∑ 	D*R -* , )*  ∑ 	D*R 3-* , )*6)*f (12) 
• The optimal procurement auction can be obtained by searching over ), )̅ for the optimal threshold 
value )∗ that yields the highest value of o)∗.  
A Contingent Procurement Auction 
In the previous section, the procurement mechanism is implemented before the demand is realized. In 
this sense, the auction is not contingent on the uncertain demand, which can cause ex-post inefficiency: 
The cellular network might purchase either too much or too little bandwidth. Contingent contracts can be 
useful in mitigating this problem. In this section, the auction rule is contingent on demand uncertainty. 
A prerequisite for a contingent contract is that the uncertain demand should be contractable, which 
means the realized demand must be one that both cellular network and hostpots can observe and measure 
and that neither side can covertly manipulate. An increasingly important response to cost pressure in 
supply chains is the collaboration between retailers and suppliers, which involves more data sharing and 
                                                             
13 When -  0, the left-hand-side is positive. When -  E, the left-hand-side is nonpositive. More generally, -∗ can be found in the 
interval 0,E]] where ]] is the upper bound of ] . 
14 The payment schedule ` and the non-increasing property of the -')'; )' guarantee incentive compatibility. The design of -' 
guarantees optimality from the cellular network’s perspective. 
 Qiu, Rui, and Whinston / Hotspot Economics 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 11 
open book accounting (Agndal and Nilsson 2008). In our problem settings, the cellular network can 
directly observe the demand information, but the hotspots cannot observe it. In this section, we show that 
the cellular network does not have incentive to misreport the private demand information. Therefore, the 
design of a procurement auction with contingent contracts is practical.15 
Now we present a theory on how to design a profitable procurement auction with contingent contracts. 
We first consider a single region procurement auction with contingent contracts. 
If the cellular network purchases  units of bandwidth from the winning hotspot, then given the demand, , the expected reduction of congestion cost for the cellular network is: 
 q          . 
q is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and 
 q      . (13) 
The optimal contingent auction can be implemented via a quantity auction, where: 
• The cellular network announces a contingent payment-bandwidth schedule !  !(, ; 
• Each hotspot chooses a contingent bandwidth it wants to sell, (:), ;, given !(, ; 
• After the demand is realized, the cellular network announces the demand information, r; 
• The hotspot choosing the highest capacity to provide wins the auction and sells the chosen capacity, 
(), r, to the cellular provider.  
The winning hotspot with the cost parameter ) provides capacity (), r when the announcement of the 
demand is r. Note that r can be some value other than . However, we show that r   in equilibrium 
in the following proposition. In other words, the cellular network reports the demand information 
truthfully. 
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium of a single-region procurement mechanism with contingent contracts, 
the cellular network truthfully announces the demand information: r  .  
Sketchy Proof. Let qrs  r  r  s. If r t , the cellular network should pretend that 
the demand is r: Under the payment-bandwidth schedule !, the bidding strategy for a hotspot should be (∗), r, which is given by: 
 qr (  ,(, ) % ,3(, )6). 
However, the cellular network’s expected profit is  
 0  	3∗3 :1  4);D=4′)q(  (, )  3(, )6)) 
The bidding strategy (∗),   maximizes the cellular network’s expected profit. Because r t  , and (∗), r is strictly increasing in r , (∗), r cannot maximize the cellular network’s expected profit. 
Thus, the cellular network does not have incentive to misreport the demand information. ■    
Now let’s consider a multi-region procurement auction with contingent contracts. Follows from equation 
10, the expected reduction of congestion cost for the cellular network after the procurement of hotspot 
bandwidth given the demand vector , I, ⋯ , J is 
 q, I, ⋯ , J  q:;  E ⋅ ]  E ⋅ ]  , 
where ]   O⋯P=J . q:; is also increasing and concave in . When the demand is realized, the 
cellular network can observe a vector of demand, , I, ⋯ , J, and then announces a vector, ur . 
Similarly, in a multi-region procurement auction with contingent contracts, the cellular network does not 
have incentive to misreport the demand information: 
                                                             
15 Sharing demand information with hotspots is a type of open book policy for a cellular network. The continuing interaction between 
a cellular network and the hotspots makes contingent contracts more reasonable and attractive. 
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Proposition 4 In the equilibrium of a multi-region procurement auction with contingent contracts, the 
cellular network truthfully announces the demand information: vr  , I, ⋯ , J.  
Sketchy Proof. The proof is straightforward from the proof of Proposition 3. ■    
The optimal allocation for the cellular network can be implemented via a direct revelation mechanism 
where: 
• The cellular network announces a payment-bandwidth schedule *`)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J , and a 
bandwidth allocation schedule -*  (:)* , )=*, , I, ⋯ , J;; 
• Hotspot ' reports the private cost parameter )* given *`)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J and (:)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J;; 
• After the demand is realized, the cellular network announces the demand information, Xr. 
• Hotspot '  provides WiFi Capacity -*  ()* , )=* , ur  to the cellular network and its payment is *` 
*`)* , )=* , ur.  
The optimal mechanism [ *`∗)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J, (∗:)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J;\  for the cellular network is 
given by the following proposition: 
Proposition 5 In a multi-region procurement auction with contingent contracts, the optimal 
bandwidth allocation schedule -*  (∗:)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J;, for '  1,2, . . . 0 is given by: 
 qx∑ 	D*R -*  -* , )* % 3-* , )*6)*. 
where q]  qx∑ 	D*R -*  E ⋅ ]  E ⋅ ]  J∑ 	D*R -* . The optimal payment schedule *` 
*`∗)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J, for '  1,2, . . . 0 is given by: 
*`∗)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J  :(∗:)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J;, )*; 
%y 	
3∗
3b
3:(∗:)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J;, );). 
 Sketchy Proof. The proof is straightforward from the proof of Proposition 2. ■   
In this section, our procurement mechanism is a static model. However, we can easily extend it to a 
dynamic model if we assume that the cost parameter of hotspot ' at time U, )*z, is drawn from a stationary 
distribution. We interpret )*z  as the instantaneous user demand of hotspot '  at time U  excluding the 
offloading traffic from the cellular network. This assumption is reasonable when the instantaneous user 
demands of hotspots varies over time.16 In each period, we can implement the procurement auction in a 
similar way. In a dynamic model, an automated system for bidding is needed because of the speed of the 
procurement auctions. Mobile data traffic changes quickly overtime, so the real-time auctions tend to be 
more efficient than other procurement mechanisms. 
The process flow for a dynamic model is shown in Figure 4. Step 1 computes the optimal mechanism 
including the optimal payment schedule, *`∗)* , )=* , , I, ⋯ , J, and the optimal bandwidth allocation 
schedule, (:)* , )=*, , I, ⋯ , J;, according to Proposition 5. We call Step 1 the pre-computing stage. 
After data traffic is generated at time U, an automated system automatically bids for hotspots given its 
instantaneous user demand, )*z. Our system finds the contingent contract: *`∗)*z , )=** , , I, ⋯ , J and (:)*z , )=*z , , I, ⋯ , J;, given the data traffic at time U, z  z , Iz ,⋯ , Jz, and the auction results are 
shown, all in a fraction of a second. We call Step 2 - Step 4 the real-time auction stage. Like the display 
advertising auctions (McAfee, 2011), speed is of the essence in our real-time procurement auction, 
because slow process of showing the auction results would sacrifice the cellular network’s profit. At time 
U % 1, we repeat the real time stage and show the corresponding auction results when the data traffic is 
z  z, Iz, ⋯ , Jz.  
                                                             
16 If the private cost parameters of the hotspots remain unchanged over time, then we have a dynamic auction problem (Ausubel and 
Cramton 2006; Ausubel 2006). Truth telling might not be the optimal strategy in period 1 because it reveals the hotspots’ cost 
parameters. 
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Figure  4. The Process Flow for the Automated Auction System 
 
Simulation Results 
In this section, applying our model to the cellular service provider data from one of the largest US service 
providers, we addresses the following questions: As compared with the standard VCG auction, how much 
can our optimal procurement auction improve the cellular network's expected payoff? The Monte Carlo 
simulation results demonstrate that compared to the standard VCG auction, our contingent procurement 
auction significantly improves the cellular network's expected payoff.  
Before we do the comparison, we first review the multi-unit Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction for 
procurement in our context. The following list describes the VCG procurement auction: 
• Invite each hotspot to report its cost parameter ) . Denote the submitted cost parameters as 
g), )I, ⋯ , )Dh. 
• Under the VCG mechanism, the socially efficient allocation minimizes the sum of the expected 
congestion cost of the cellular network and the cost of hotspots. According to equation 8, we have the sum 
of the expected congestion cost, and the minimization problem is formalized as follows:  
 min2 ,2O,...,2|E 	

  	 ⋯ 	 ]  ], I, ⋯ , J % ∑ 	D*R -* , )* 
T. U. -* 1 0, for'  1,2, . . . , 0, 
]  1E}	
J
*R
*  1E}	
J
*R
-* . 
• Let ~), )I, ⋯ , ) be the optimal value of the objective function, and let -∗, -I∗, ⋯ , -D∗ be an optimal 
solution to the cost minimization problem. Let ~=*)=* be the optimal value of the objective function with 
the additional constraint -*  0 (i.e., hotspot ' does not participate in the auction). 
• The cellular network will pay hotspot ' according to the following:  
 *`  ~=*)=*  ~), )I, ⋯ , )D % -*∗, )* (16) 
where ~=*)=*  ~), )I, ⋯ , )D is the bonus payment to hotspot ', representing the positive externality 
that hotspot ' is imposing on the cost minimization problem. The cellular network pays hotspot ' its cost 
-*∗, )*, plus its contribution to the cost minimization problem. This payment internalizes the externality. 
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• Hotspot ' provides capacity -*∗ and receives payment *`.  
Note that the VCG auction is both truth-telling and socially efficient by standard arguments. All hotspots 
bid their cost parameters truthfully, irrespective of other hotspots’ bids. The VCG mechanism guarantees 
the minimum total cost. However, it leads to an overpayment to hotspots that is shown in the simulation.  
In our simulations, we consider a typical urban neighborhood in New York City, NY, USA, as shown in 
Figure 5. We define a cell sector as the range of the cell tower. Our dataset consists of the location 
information of 14,576 cell towers from a large cellular provider in the US. In our simulation studies, we 
pick a cell tower in New York City from the full list of cell towers and simulate the mobile data demand in 
this sector. In Figure 5, T represents the cell tower, and others are 69 WiFi hotspots17 in the given cell 
sector. 
 
Figure  5. Area Map of A Typical Cell Sector 
 
 Following Dong et al. (2012), we set the communication range for a cell tower as 250m, and set the 
communication range for Wi-Fi as 100m. The following steps describe the procedure of simulations: 
  ·  Generating traffic demands in the given cell sector. To gain a sense of the population density in the 
coverage area of the cell tower, we use 2010 census data, which contains the land area coverage and 
population density of each zip code. Combining the market share18 of this service provider for the first 
quarter 2013, we estimate the number of users in the given cell sector. On average, smartphone users 
consume about 1GB data per month, but the usage patterns of mobile data is highly uneven.19 Paul et al. 
(2011) and Jin et al. (2012) find that a small number of heavy users contribute to a majority of data usage 
in the network. To consider the heterogeneity of data usage and the effects of peak hours, we simulate 
                                                             
17 Locations of commercial WiFi hotspots are from http://wigle.net. 
18 See http://www.talkandroid.com/159929-t-mobile-loses-market-share-while-verizon-and-att-continue-to-dominate. 
19  See http://www.fiercewireless.com/special-reports/average-android-ios-smartphone-data-use-across-tier-1-wireless-carriers-
thr-1#ixzz2ZSpDoS5Z. 
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individual data usage from the byte distribution in Jin et al. (2012).20 
  ·  Generating WiFi regions in the cell sector. Dong et al. (2012) show that the appropriate number of 
WiFi regions in a cell sector is six. Following their approach, we generate six WiFi regions by clustering 
the Wi-Fi hotspots using k-means. In Figure 5, Region A, Region B, ... , and Region F indicate which 
region the WiFi hotspots belong to. Note that, in a dynamic model, the cellular service provider may 
dynamically define the WiFi regions to maximize its expected payoff. 
 
 
Figure  6. The Performance Comparion of the Procurement Mechanisms for the Service Provider 
 
  ·  Generating traffic demands in each WiFi region. We use two different methods to place users in the cell 
sector and assign them to the corresponding WiFi regions according to their locations. (1) All users are 
randomly placed in the cell sector. (2) All users are placed according to the densities of the hotspots.21 
After placing all the users, a nearest hotspot is calculated for each user location. If the distance between 
the nearest hotspot found and the user location is less than the hotspot range (100m), the user is counted 
as one of the regional population according to the WiFi region; otherwise, the user is considered as in the 
region with no hotspots (region 0). We run 1,000 simulations to generate traffic demands in each WiFi 
region. 
  ·  Generating cell tower capacity. The cell tower capacity is set to 3 carriers i.e., 3 times 3.84 MHz (Dong 
et al. 2012). Data spectral efficiency varies across towers from 0.5 to 2 bps/Hz.22 We set spectral efficiency 
to be 1 by default Note that when the user demand for mobile data is below 80% of the cell tower capacity, 
the cellular service provider faces no congestion cost. 
Using the algorithms in Section 4, we conduct a variety of simulations and compute the corresponding 
allocation under the VCG mechanism and our contingent procurement auction (CPA). We set the 
parameter values: Cx  2xI, and Cx, θ  [I% θ\ xI. θ is drawn from a uniform distribution 0,1 for 
1,000 times. The choice of parameter values follows from previous literature (Joseph et al. 2004).  
                                                             
20 We obtain the quantiles of the byte distribution from Jin et al. (2012) and generate inidvidual usage using the Johnson System. 
We also adjust the usage by considering the effect of peak hours, see http://chitika.com/browsing-activity-by-hour. 
21 To calculate the densities of the hotspots for different locations, we divide the square circumscribing the cell sector into a 20 by 20 
array of grids. By default, each grid has a weight of 1, except the grids whose centers are not in the range of the tower. The grid's 
weight is increased by the number of hotspots whose locations are inside the grid. Then, a list of grid indices is created according to 
the weight of each grid. Finally, for each user, a grid index is first uniformly chosen from the list, and then the location of the user is 
uniformly chosen from the range of the grid with the grid index just picked. 
22 See http://www.rysavy.com/Articles/2011_05_Rysavy_Efficient_Use_Spectrum.pdf 
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The simulation result of the performance comparison is shown in Figure 6. In the left panel, the users are 
randomly placed in the cell sector. In the right panel, the users are placed according to the densities of the 
hotspots. The two panels show similar results: our CPA system significantly outperforms the VCG 
mechanism in terms of the expected net gain of the cellular service provider (the expected net gain = the 
reduction of the congestion cost - the payment to hotspots). Note that both of the two panels suggest that 
the VCG mechanism leads to an overpayment to hotspots. The VCG mechanism is socially efficient in 
terms of minimizing the sum of the expected congestion costs of both the cellular service provider and 
hotspots. However, it is not optimal for the cellular service provider. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we designed an optimal procurement auction with contingent contracts for mobile data 
offloading. The integration of both cellular and WiFi resources significantly improves mobile bandwidth 
availability. We characterize the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction and compute the 
corresponding contingent contract. The simulation results show that our procurement auction 
significantly outperforms the standard VCG auction. 
In the telecommunications industry, consumers, especially business users, are concerned about mobile 
QoS because the effects of congestion are costly to them. For simplicity, we abstract away the consumer 
side in our model. A direction for future research is to study the procurement auction when consumers 
form rational expectations of the network congestion. It allows the cellular network to consider various 
types of QoS warranties — that is, when a severe congestion occurs, the cellular network compensates 
business users through monetary payments, or other forms of goodwill. The provision of warranties may 
serve as signals of QoS for cellular networks. 
In our procurement auction, we assume one cellular network and many WiFi Hotspots. In many 
geographical markets, one cellular network may dominate and operate as a monopoly (Cramton, 
Skrzypacz, and Wilson 2007). In this case, a procurement auction framework with one cellular network is 
appropriate. However, an intense duopoly competition has arisen between Verizon and AT&T in some 
other areas. Thus, an important direction for future research is to extend our model to a setting with 
multiple cellular networks and many WiFi hotspots. In this problem setting, the design of the optimal 
procurement auction remains an open question. 
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